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People v. Ruthford: Reversible Error
Standards for Prosecutorial
Suppression of Evidence
By

WILLIAM

M.

GOODMAN*

Introduction
In an unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Wright, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed in People v. Ruthfordt that a prosecutor must
"disclose all substantial material evidence favorable to an accused," irrespective of defense counsel's request for such evidence.' The decision
established that the prosecutor's duty to disclose extends to evidence related
3
to guilt or punishment as well as to the credibility of material witnesses,
and that this duty of disclosure is mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the federal Constitution. 4 In determining whether the prosecutor's negligent or wilful failure to provide evidence bearing on. the credibility of a
witness contitutes a denial of due process, the court further held that the
constitutional harmless error test of Chapman v. California5 must be applied. 6 In that case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a federal
constitutional error would be deemed harmless if "the court [were] able to
declare. . . that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 7 The Ruthford court concluded that when the prosecutor suppressed evidence of the
principal motivation for adverse testimony by a key prosecution witness, the
defendant was denied a fair trial, and that this error was not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.8
*

B.A., 1971, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley;

member, California bar. Assistant Federal Public Defender, Northern District of California,
San Francisco, California. Mr. Goodman was a research extern for Chief Justice Wright from
September 1972 to January 1973 and a research attorney for the Chief Justice from August 1974
to July 1975. He also served on the staff of the California Supreme Court Special Masters on
Reapportionment from June to October 1973.
1. 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1975).
2. Id. at 406, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (emphasis omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 408, 534 P.2d at 1347, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
5. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
6. 14 Cal. 3d at 408-09, 534 P.2d at 1347-48, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68.
7. 386 U.S. at 24.
8. 14 Cal. 3d at 410, 534 P.2d at 1348, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
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People v. Ruthford9 exemplifies Chief Justice Wright's concern for
fairness in the criminal justice system. The purpose of this article is to
examine the mode of analysis employed by the Chief Justice in defining the
scope of the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense.
The significance of Chief Justice Wright's contribution to criminal procedure will hopefully be revealed by this discussion of the case.
I. The Facts
Fred Thomas and another man entered an apartment occupied by Mrs.
Constance Hannaford and Mr. Ferdinand Castillo. Thomas displayed a gun,
announced a "holdup," and the two men proceeded to rob the apartment.
The robbers induced Castillo to lead them to a cache of money hidden in a
closet in return for Mrs. Hannaford's safety. As the pair left the apartment,
Castillo ran toward the getaway car. Thomas got out and scuffled with
Castillo while the accomplice remained in the car. The getaway car, later
found abandoned, was traced through the license number to Thomas. The
trial record indicated that Thomas and defendant Ruthford were neighbors
and that they had traveled to Las Vegas with their wives on the evening of
the robbery. Several items taken during the robbery were later discovered in
10
a Las Vegas pawn shop.
At trial, Castillo could not identify Ruthford as Thomas' accomplice.
Mrs. Hannaford had failed to identify Ruthford both in a lineup and a
photospread, but she positively identified him as the accomplice at trial.
Although she had paid little attention to the accomplice during the robbery,'1 she testified that she had recognized his profile at the preliminary
hearing. 12 Thomas, who was the final prosecution witness, testified that
Ruthford was his accomplice and corroborated the victims' description of
the robbery. " After two and a half days of deliberation, the jury returned a
guilty verdict against Ruthford.14
After the trial, Thomas sent a letter to Ruthford stating: "The D.A.
came to see me and offered me [my wife's] freedom in return for my
testimony against you."' 5 On the basis of this disclosure, Ruthford moved
for a new trial, claiming that the prosecution had suppressed evidence
9. 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1975).
10. Id. at 401-02, 534 P.2d at 1342-43, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63.
11. "[S]he had looked directly at him 'U]ust for a split second' but had had a good side
." Id. at 402, 534 P.2d at 1343, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
view of him.
12. Id.
13. Id. Thomas had previously pleaded guilty to one armed robbery charge arising from
the Hannaford/Castillo incident and to three other armed robbery counts; the prosecutor
dismissed twelve other charges. Id. at 402 n. 1, 534 P.2d at 1343 n.l, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 263 n.1.

14. Id. at 410, 534 P.2d at 1348, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
15. Id. at 403, 534 P.2d at 1343, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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relevant to Thomas' credibility. The record at the hearing for a new trial
revealed that Thomas had indicated to deputy district attorney Norris a
willingness to testify against Ruthford if Thomas' wife, who had recently
been convicted of another robbery, received a lenient sentence. Thomas'
position was communicated to the trial judge who was to sentence Mrs.
Thomas. After being informed that the judge "would consider" Thomas'
cooperation, Norris relayed this message to Thomas in the presence of the
deputy district attorney who subsequently prosecuted defendant Ruthford.
The record further indicated that both Norris and Thomas understood that
the quid pro quo for Thomas' testimony was the assurance that, if incarcerated at all, Mrs. Thomas would not receive a state prison term. 16 Despite
this showing, which demonstrated that the deputy district attorney had
suppressed crucial evidence bearing upon the credibility of a key prosecution witness, the motion for a new trial was denied.17
II.

The Decision

A. The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
In his petition for hearing in the California Supreme Court, Ruthford
alleged that either the prosecutor's affirmative misrepresentation to the trial
judge about inducements for Thomas' testimony 8 or the prosecutor's failure
to inform Ruthford or his trial attorney of the inducement warranted a new
trial. 19 In addressing these claims, Chief Justice Wright began his analysis
by examining California: and federal authority governing a prosecutor's duty
to disclose substantial material evidence favorable to the defense. The Chief
Justice noted that the duty of disclosure exists because the prosecutor is
more than an advocate; he is a participant in the adversary system of
criminal justice who must "fully and fairly present to the court the evidence
material to the charge upon which the defendant stands trial.'"20 To impose a
lesser responsibility would permit the prosecutor to suppress evidence favorable to the accused and thereby allow him to gain unfair control over the
fact-finding province of the judge or jury.
16. Id. at 404, 534 P.2d at 1344, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 264. At the hearing on the motion for a
new trial, Thomas was asked if he had "received special consideration." Thomas, "a manifestly clever witness," testified that he was never asked at Ruthford's trial a general question as to
why he had testified: "'There was always a qualification on the question, and I answered the
questions as they were asked. They were asked semantically. I answered them semantically.'"

Id.
17. Id. (by implication).
18. The hearing record also showed that during Ruthford's trial, the judge asked prosecu-

tor Weiner if Thomas had been granted immunity. Weiner's response was, "No. There is no
immunity. He [Thomas] is convicted, I think, of 10 counts. There was no promise made to
him." Id. at 405 n.2, 534 P.2d at 1345 n.2, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 265 n.2 (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 404-05, 534 P.2d at 1344, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 264.

20. Id. at 405, 534 P.2d at 1345, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (quoting In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d
525, 531, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1971)).
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The Chief Justice relied upon three cases in explaining the prosecutor's
duty to disclose. He reiterated that the state's high court had recently held in
the case of In re Ferguson2 1 that a prosecutor must "disclose substantial
material evidence favorable to the accused without [a] request" for such
22
evidence from either the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court.
Chief Justice Wright also observed that both Brady v.Maryland, 3 the
leading United States Supreme Court opinion on the prosecutor's duty to
disclose, and Ferguson deemed the prosecutor's good or bad faith irrelevant
in suppressing evidence favorable to the defendant.2 4 Finally, the Chief
Justice noted that Giglio v. United States,25 which was decided subsequent
to Ferguson and Brady, not only reaffirmed the duty to disclose such
evidence but also imposed upon the prosecutor the additional "duty to
correct false or misleading testimony concerning inducements for incriminating testimony and the duty to disclose such inducements to the
defense and to the jury.''26 In sum, Chief Justice Wright formulated the
prosecutor's disclosure duty in California as follows:
We recognize the foregoing cases as establishing a duty on the
party of the prosecution, even in the absence of a request therefor,
to disclose all substantial material evidence favorable to an accused, whether such evidence relates directly to the question of
guilt, to matters relevant to punishment, or to the credibility of a
material witness.2 7
While this holding clarified existing California precedent, it did not
substantially change the cited case law. Ferguson had established that a
defense request for exculpatory evidence was unnecessary; 28 it had also
extended the duty of disclosure to include evidence relevant to the credibility of a key witness. 29 The significance of Ruthford is that by relying in part
on Giglio it left no potential exceptions to the prosecutorial disclosure rule.
California prosecutors may have once assumed that they were constitutionally required to disclose all inducements for incriminating testimony and to
correct false and misleading testimony about such inducements; 30 Ruthford
leaves no doubt that they now have an affirmative duty to do so.
B. The Test for Reversible Error
Having reaffirmed and clarified the prosecutorial disclosure rule, Chief
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971).
14 Cal. 3d at 405-06, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
14 Cal. 3d at 406, 534 P.2d at 1345, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
14 Cal. 3d at 406, 534 P.2d at 1345, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
Id., 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (emphasis in original).
See text accompanying note 22 supra.
14 Cal. 3d at 407, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (false and misleading testimony).
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Justice Wright considered the effect of a breach of this duty on a judgment
of conviction when the suppressed evidence bears on the credibility of a
material witness. The Chief Justice began his analysis by noting that where
material evidence bearing directly on the question of guilt has been suppressed by the prosecutor, and a fair trial is denied as a result, the reviewing
court must employ a per se reversible error rule. 31 If the court concludes that
the suppressed evidence would have been considered on the issue of guilt if
it had been made known to the finder of fact, the court must reverse the
32
conviction without weighing the degree of prejudice to the accused.
Reversal is mandatory because evidence bearing on the issue of guilt is at
the very heart of the fact-finding process in a criminal case. Suppression of
such evidence, particularly when favorable to the defense, has an incalculable effect upon the judge or jury; normally the evidence is so important to a
defendant's case that the prosecutor's suppression deprives the defendant of
both the appearance and reality of a fair trial.
Following these guidelines, the Chief Justice discussed whether the
suppression of material evidence bearing on the credibility of a key prosecutorial witness constitutes denial of a fair trial, and, if so, whether automatic
reversal of a judgment of conviction is required. He turned to federal
precedent, noting that in Giglio and Napue v. Illinois33 the United States
Supreme Court reversed convictions where material evidence bearing on the
credibility of a witness had been suppressed by the prosecutor. 34 Giglio held
that reversal was required because the prosecutor's conduct "did not comport with 'due process requirements.' -35 Similarly, Napue stated that a
conviction partially obtained on the basis of false testimony that reflected on
the credibility of a witness "must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. "36
In both of these cases, however, the Court was careful to point out that it
was not articulating a per se reversible error rule; rather, Napue and Giglio
held that where the suppression of such evidence may have affected the
verdict, reversal is required. 37 The Ruthford court thus noted that "when the
31. 14 Cal. 3d at 406-07, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
32. Id. at 407, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266. "It is necessary in such circum-

stances, of course, that the materiality of the evidence suppressed or otherwise not disclosed be
examined in order that we may judge whether an accused has been fairly tried, but that
examination is one which goes to the question of the materiality of the evidence rather than
prejudice to the accused." Id.
Ruthford does not require that the suppressed evidence that is material to and favorable to
the defense on the issue of guilt be evidence that would necessarily affect the verdict since such
a requirement would render the per se rule meaningless.

33. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
34. 14 Cal. 3d at 407-08, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
35. Id. at 408, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 155 (1972)).
36. 360 U.S. at 269.

37. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
271 (1959).
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credibility of a key witness is at issue an accused is not entitled to the
reversal of a judgment of conviction obtained by the suppression of material
substantial evidence unless prejudice is demonstrated.''38
Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court had found that
prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the defense is a due
process issue, Chief Justice Wright likewise concluded that "the suppression of substantial material evidence bearing on the credibility of a key
prosecution witness is a denial of due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 3 9 He further reasoned that whether such a denial
of due process required reversal must be determined by deference to the
appropriate federal standard.' The rule articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Chapman v. California4 l for federal constitutional denials
resulting from error by the court was then adopted for application to similar
denials resulting from error by the prosecution: "An accused, accordingly,
is entitled to relief in such circumstances unless we can declare a belief that
the denial 'was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' "42 The Chief Justice
emphasized that a per se rule similar to that utilized in the case of suppressed
evidence bearing directly on guilt or innocence was not being adopted in the
present case where the suppressed evidence was relevant to credibility
only. 43 If the latter type of suppressed evidence would not have affected the
verdict, reversal of a conviction is not required "simply because a complete
accounting of all conceivably exculpatory evidence [was] not made."4
The Chief Justice concluded his analysis with an application of the
Chapman test to the Ruthford facts.45 The record indicated that only one of
the two victims, Mrs. Hannaford, could identify the defendant as the
robbery accomplice, despite the fact that the second victim, Mr. Castillo,
had a greater opportunity to observe him. Moreover, it was clear that the
testimony of Thomas, whose credibility was effectively insulated from
defense attack, was devastating to the defendant. Finally, the jury deliberated two and a half days before returning the guilty verdict, even though
Thomas' possible motive for perjury was unknown to the jury. Under those
circumstances, a unanimous court held that the prosecutor's suppression of
the inducement for Thomas' testimony was not harmless beyond a rea46
sonable doubt, and accordingly reversed the judgment of conviction.
38. 14 Cal. 3d at 408, 534 P.2d at 1347, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 408-09, 534 P.2d at 1347, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 267.

41. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
42. 14 Cal. 3d at 408, 534 P.2d at 1347, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 267 (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
43. 14 Cal. 3d at 409, 534 P.2d at 1348, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 268.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 409-410, 534 P.2d at 1348, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
46. Id. at 410, 534 P.2d at 1348, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
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Conclusion
Under Chief Justice Wright's leadership, the California Supreme Court
broke new ground in the area of criminal law and procedure. It clarified the
rights of criminal defendants to ensure that the criminal justice system
established a proper balance between the interests of the prosecution and
those of the defense. The clarification of the reversible error test applicable
to suppression of evidence by the prosecutor that was set forth in People v.
Ruthford4 7 is an important contribution to the maintenance of that balance.
The case laid to rest any doubts that may have remained concerning the
scope of the prosecutor's duty to disclose substantial material evidence
favorable to the defense. The opinion also reflects Chief Justice Wright's
concern for fairness in the criminal justice system. His insistence upon both
the appearance of fairness and actual fairness was one of the Chief Justice's
great contributions to California criminal jurisprudence.
47. 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1975).

